The Next 100 Years

George Friedman’s Book

Friedman wrote a book with this title at the end of 2008. I have always enjoyed reading the work of “futurists” and I read this with eagerness, thinking it would rank among other greats such as the writings of Alvin Toffler, John Naisbitt, Arthur C. Clarke, Herman Kahn.

What a disappointment! It turns out that Friedman is an “armchair admiral” who bases all his forecasts on geopolitics, a concept that was already deemed outdated by Toffler in “Powershift” (1990), twenty years ago…

How did Friedman’s book become a bestseller, then? Quite simply, because it says what a lot of people would like to hear. It caters to everyone who thinks that war is inevitable and even desirable to spur economic growth, regardless of which countries or cultures are involved. A lot of people at the Pentagon must have loved it, plus everyone who makes money from making and selling arms and weapons.

The main predictions that Friedman presents make captivating headlines. They are:

1. The “Muslims vs Christians/Jews” conflict will fizzle out before 2020, no need to worry about that

2. China will not become a world power, but will be fragmented into smaller countries by 2020

3. Russia will attempt to revive the Soviet Union and will fail, fragmenting again and losing territory to its neighbors

4. The US will engage in World War III against Poland, Japan and Turkey in 2050 (these will be the four major powers in the world by then)

5. World War III will be fought by missiles fired from “battle stars” in space and from secret bases on the dark side of the moon

6. The US will dominate the world throughout all of the 21^st Century and will emerge from WWIII even stronger and more dominant

7. Germany and France will slowly lose relevance from 2020 onwards, and South America and Africa will remain irrelevant at least for the next 50 years

8. In 2080 American power will be challenged to war by Mexico (with Brazil as an ally) in an attempt to dominate North America and regain the territory it lost to the Americans in 1848

The author does some fairly good analysis work. He raises some interesting issues. He tries to spot “underlying trends” which drive his analysis. However, he fails miserably when drawing conclusions, often contradicting his own initial assertions. And the reason for that is that he has some basic assumptions which are quite biased and mistaken. These biases throw his conclusions off track.

Friedman’s vision has a strong Anglo-Saxon bias. It comes from a “Contest” culture, in which the underlying values are performance, competing to win, bigger is better, and the use of force is the best way to reach your goals. He makes the basic mistake of assuming that all cultures share these same values. This is a gross mistake. Scandinavians do not think like Americans, neither do the Chinese, the Indians, the Arabs. Not even the Russians think like Americans (this may come as a surprise to some folks at the Pentagon…).

Friedman identifies (correctly) some important social trends, though all of them already widely known and explored in today’s media, such as the “graying of the workforce”, the decrease in population growth, the increased participation of women in management and politics, the fact that this will impact the structure of the family. In one of the most disappointing features of his book, he fails to take his social analysis further. He fails to predict how the greater presence of women as business and political leaders all over the world might affect diplomacy and mitigate the risk of all-out wars (Sarah Palin excepted). He fails to predict how a population who will be 30 years older on average might affect the way politics are carried out or how that will affect decisions about war.

Friedman also neglects some other very important underlying trends, such as:

a) the inter-connectedness of the new generations: as people all over the world are able to remain connected instantly, 24x7, anywhere, how will that affect people’s disposition to go to war? When war victims can broadcast instantly videos of the horrors of war, live to the whole world, how will that affect the support of such attacks?

b) The increase in travel: as people travel more and more and interact directly with other cultures, wouldn’t that make it less likely to “demonize” distant “tribes”? If more Iranians visit the US (and vice-versa), won’t that make it evident that Bush and Amadinedjad had more in common than they had in contrast? (We’d be better off without both of them…)

c) The globalization of business: if one third of assets in the US are actually owned by the Japanese, Turks and Europeans, wouldn’t that make them less prone to attacking the US? If American companies have their manufacturing done in Turkey and Poland, how likely are these companies to support bombing their own plants?

Because of his military bias, Friedman fails to see that:

a) generals do not rule the world

b) wars will be fought in very different ways in the future (forget about playing “Star Wars” on the moon…)

Let’s take the cynical view that “money makes the world go around”. Businessmen rule the world, not generals. Generals are manipulated by businessmen to serve business interests. Businesses elect politicians. Candidates cannot get elected without significant business support, nowhere. When countries go to war, it is because enough businessmen stand behind it. This basically means that there have to be enough businesses involved in selling weapons and war supplies compared to businesses who will make more money if a war is avoided. The trend, therefore, is that poor countries, with low acquisition power, are the ones targeted (Africa, Middle East). The more affluent a country, the more consumers of global products it has, the less interested businesses will be in attacking these consumers, since there will be more money to be made from selling goods to them then from selling weapons to attack them. The game has changed. We’re not playing “Battleship” or “Combat”, we’re playing “Monopoly”.

I won’t even go into the moral & ethical aspects of war. Both generals and businessmen tend to consider such aspects as being naïve and unrealistic.

Will everybody be nice to each other in the future? Will the beauty pageant candidates’ ideal of “world peace” finally come true? Will we finally have beauty pageant candidates whose IQ will exceed the sum of their body measurements (36+24+36)?

I’m afraid the answer to these questions is negative.

Countries (and international businesses) will still compete and fight each other. However, it is very likely that:

a) countries as “nation-states” will have less relevance than today, making way for “regional economic blocks”

b) rather than shooting missiles or laser ray-guns at each other, fighting is more likely to take the shape of cyber attacks. The most relevant environment will be “cyberspace”, rather than the moon or the seas. Friedman, as a retired naval officer, correctly realized that the seas will be less relevant in war, but he replaced them with outer space in his military thinking. He would do better to focus on “cyberspace” instead.

c) Szun Tsu, the Chinese military genius of another millennium, described “the art of war” as the art of avoiding combat. That is very likely to be the trend (still) in the next 100 years. We are more likely to have economic wars or cold wars, but the likelihood of involving developed societies in combat will be less and less likely.

Aggression is a part of human nature. However, the evolution of mankind has brought about socially smarter ways of expressing aggression, such as competing in sports. War is not only morally wrong, it is also very stupid. Competition and aggression will continue to exist, but they will be more and more about “mind games” which involve subjugating others, rather than destroying others.

Perhaps the biggest unanticipated change we will see in the next 100 years will be a shift towards new ways of education and the search for meaning, rather than clinging to superstition/religion and shooting anybody who does not agree with you. But that’s another story, to be explored elsewhere and at another time.

The most worrying aspect of Friedman’s book is that so many people are still thinking like him. So many people are still looking at reality using a 19^th Century perspective, based on nation-states, geopolitics, and “shooting to survive”. Unless we decide to make significant investments in education reform, we still run the risk of seeing some of Friedman’s deranged predictions come true.

Friedman’s overture

His main point in his introductory remarks is that the US is not decreasing in power, but rather the age of American domination is just beginning. I can see how that point came across quite well at the Pentagon…

According to Friedman, the 20^th Century was not dominated by the Americans, it was dominated by Europe. American domination only began with the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. He seems to think that from 1945 t01990, although the US had the largest share of World GDP, had the most powerful armed forces, and spread American products all over the planet, still it was not “dominating”… There was still the perceived threat of the Soviet Union, although it never matched any of the American achievements by any standard.

I guess the main problem with this line of thinking is that it fails to look at economic data, focusing only on military power, expressed as military spending. Friedman thinks the US “dominates” only when its military spending exceeded the rest of the world combined.

It gets worse. Friedman explains that the main reason for American domination in the next 100 years will be the fact that it has access to both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, thereby it dominates world trade.

Nothing about American entrepreneurship, ability to innovate, nothing about having the best universities in the world, nothing about technology, politics or democracy, nothing about culture. It’s location, location, location, as if Friedman was a retired naval officer who turned into a real estate agent.

He goes on to say that the 21^st Century will “revolve around… secondary powers forming coalitions to try to contain the US… and the US acting preemptively to prevent an effective coalition from forming. The 21^st Century will see more war than the 20^th…”

What Friedman fails to see is that the American share of world GDP already peaked in the 70’s and has been decreasing ever since, along with the UK’s. It is not so much that the US and the UK are not growing, but rather that many other countries are growing faster, and economic output is gradually being redistributed more evenly among nations. This is being fostered by the globalization of companies, who manufacture products in many different parts of the world, proceeding to distribute and sell them to the whole planet. Ultimately, this means that nation-states will be less relevant in the future, since economic interests (including the labor force) will be distributed internationally. Is General Motors still an American company when its cars are made in Germany by Turkish immigrants and the shareholders come from India and the Middle East?

The underlying trend, therefore, is one of greater balance among several powers. It will be more about “multilateralism”, a concept discussed prior to the invasion of Iraq, and which the American government failed to see then, just as Friedman continues to be blind to it almost ten years afterwards.

The decline of the British Empire followed a similar path. The UK held a huge share of world GDP in the middle of the 19^th Century. Although they started the Industrial Revolution, the English did not realize that one of its consequences was the decentralization of production, away from the UK, leading also to the independence of its former colonies. By the end of WWII the UK had already ceased to have the largest share of world GDP, replaced by the US. The American share continued to climb until the 70s, when the first oil crisis brought a shift of income to the Middle East and subsequently other developing countries accelerated growth (notably BRIC and Southeast Asia).

Friedman also chooses to completely ignore the European Union as if it never existed… He talks about Germany and France as separate, individual entities. Maybe he thinks the European Union will collapse before 2020 (another idea that would go down well at the Pentagon!).

Friedman does acknowledge the existence of different cultures, but his mistake is to conclude that”…national identity matters a great deal…, the relationship between nations is a vital dimension of human life, and that means that war is ubiquitous.” This is like saying that neighbors will necessarily shoot each other, sooner or later…

People do organize themselves in groups larger than families, but their loyalties lie deeper in certain groups with shared values. These groups do not necessarily coincide with nation-states, which is why, for instance, the so-called “United States” are so deeply divided about certain things (like abortion, health-care, religion, the so-called “culture wars” within America). Politicians try to promote “nation-states” to serve economic interests, with varying degrees of success (or failure). Nobody is fighting over the “Chaco” (the swamplands of Paraguay), because it has no economic value. If somebody finds oil down there we will have a different situation. Not driven by the military, not driven by politicians, but driven by business people.

At the beginning of the 20^th Century, the British still felt that they were ruling the world “…not by the might of its navy nor by the power of its armies, but by its sheer presence!”. When Roosevelt and Stalin sat down to re-organize the world at the end of WWII, the most amazing aspect of that meeting was that Churchill maneuvered himself to be there with them… Britain had been declining already for half a century, yet they were not fully aware of it and neither were many other leaders.

Similarly, the US is also declining slowly in terms of World GDP share, yet it still sees itself as absolutely dominant.

I am not saying that the US is not powerful, or that it will cease to be the most powerful nation on Earth. All I am saying is that it will no longer be “absolutely” powerful. The European Union already has a larger share of World GDP than the US. In 50 years, what we will see is simply a host of economic blocks, similar in size, all trying to co-exist, rather than trying to annihilate each other. Military power will still be important, but it is a very limited solution to conflict. The US has been more successful (and will continue to be) by using economic power rather than military power. However, since other blocks are gaining in economic power, the result in 50 years will be a greater balance in the distribution of this power.

Friedman’s vision is biased by a “Contest” culture point of view, hinged on conflict and a “polarized” perception of reality. The future of the world will be more akin to a “Network” culture (Dutch-Scandinavian) point of view, a multi-lateral clash of forces which try to keep each other in check. There is constant arguing and dissent, but violence is not as frequent. This will be further enhanced by the ascension of women in business and politics, all over the world. What John Lennon called the “femininization” of society, beginning in the 60’s, will continue well into the 21^st Century.

The Dawn of the American Age (or rather: Don’t Wake Me Up, I Want To Finish My Dream)

Friedman explains on his first chapter why American power is just beginning. He even mentions some figures, such as that in 2007 US GDP was 14 trillion, or 26% of World GDP. He fails to point out that the European Union already had 14,5 trillion in GDP, and that the American share had peaked at 30% in the 70’s and has been going down ever since. In 2050 it will be around 15%, while China will be roughly the same. Both will be slightly less than the European Union, which should have about 16%. These projections take into account the estimate that China will not continue to grow at rates of 9% a year, but rather will de-accelerate its growth gradually. By the time China reaches the size of the US and Europe, it will be growing at a similar pace (1-2% a year).

Friedman focuses on American self-doubt and argues against it. The problem is that his arguments are all about how important military power is, most especially naval power. No mention of American capabilities in terms of technology, business acumen, entrepreneurship or educational institutions. Nothing about American culture and how it is changing because of immigration, disenchantment with religion, the ascent of women, the impact of the internet. Perhaps these other factors might justify the belief that America will continue to dominate the world. However, Friedman prefers to ignore all this, just as he ignores the existence of the European Union. It seems he was just dreaming about American dominance, not even making a proper case for it.

Earthquake – The US – Jihadist War (or rather: the real American Strategy from 1900 to 2100)

This is perhaps the soundest chapter in the book, basically because its focus is not on the future, but in the past instead. It contains a good analysis of the Monroe doctrine and explains in laymen’s terms why the purpose of American intervention in foreign lands is to stop other nations from becoming a threat to the US.

“So long as the Muslims are fighting each other, the US has won its war”. (p49) The purpose of the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan has been to strengthen local factions so as to keep them fighting among themselves and not with the US.

Population, Computers and Culture Wars (or rather. Promising Title, but Conclusions Fall Short)

This is the chapter in which Friedman talks about the ascension of women and how traditional families have changed radically because of that. Very good points are made and some important statistics about the increase of women in the workforce. This is having a great impact on the population explosion, or rather: it explains why the planet’s population will cease to increase, since women are having less children all over the world. The effect is already being felt in the most developed countries of Europe and in the US, where population is growing only through immigration.

Disappointingly, Friedman fails to explore the consequences this will have for the future. For instance, if Anglo-Saxons have less children and their population decreases in the US, in Canada and the UK, while the proportion of immigrant population in these countries continues to increase, how will this affect the culture of these countries? If non Anglo-Saxons made up 22% of the American population in the year 2000, what will happen if in 2050 non-Anglos make up 45% of the population? What will happen in Europe if instead of having 6% Muslims they go to having 18% in 2050?

Friedman stresses that computers are simplifying rational tasks all over the globe, and that this will enhance American dominance because computers use the English language for programming. This seems to be a very short-sighted argument… If millions of Indian and Chinese programmers design fantastic computer programs, does that enhance American dominance because they are doing it in English? If they did it in French would it enhance French dominance? It just seems like an infantile, unfortunate argument.

Friedman finishes the chapter with a lucid awareness: “Old institutions have shattered, but new ones have not yet emerged.” (Duhh!) “The 21^st C will be a period in which a range of new institutions, moral systems and practices will begin their first tentative emergence. The first half of the 21^st C will be marked by intense social conflict globally.” (Duhh! Duhh!).

And… Friedman leaves it there and changes the subject. (!!!??) Just when it was beginning to get interesting! These “new institutions, moral systems and practices” are precisely what should be discussed! Will they push us towards a more primitive state, in which we all try to shoot each other and the world turns into chaos? Friedman seems to think that, but he does not even suggest it, let alone say it in so many words. He simply wanders off to explore his geopolitical “fault lines” and drops the sociological discussion.

Yet it is precisely this vacuum which might be filled by analyses and forecasts which could justify (or dismiss) the arguments for wars and global conflicts. Apparently, the implicit conclusion is that these “new institutions, moral systems and practices” will turn out to be not “new” at all, since Friedman goes on to describe how countries will behave like they did in the 19^th Century. As he says later in the book “History repeats itself”.

The New Fault Lines (or rather: Trying to Find Conflict Even Where There Is None)

In this chapter Friedman attempts to justify why China and Russia will try to assert themselves (nothing wrong with that prediction) to the point of posing a threat to the US (everything is wrong with that prediction, because it assumes that the Russians and Chinese would want to annihilate the US). American paranoia seems to drive Friedman into thinking that Russia and China are not interested in peaceful co-existence. Rather, they live and breathe to fight the Americans, as if there was no alternative for their own survival.

This kind of American thinking gets me really worried. Paranoid people are dangerous. Paranoid people with weapons are very dangerous.

China 2020 – Paper Tiger (or rather: No Need To Be Afraid Of China)

Napoleon once said: “China is a sleeping giant. Let China sleep, for when China awakes, the world will tremble”.

Well, China has awakened. And the Americans are trembling. Apparently, to the Anglo-Saxon point of view, as China grows it will necessarily attempt to be the only major power in the world. That is the “Contest” culture perception, thinking that necessarily there needs to be a conflict between two opposing forces (in this case, China and the US). Friedman does not think that there might be a balance of multilateral forces in the world.

He proceeds to downplay China’s capacity to remain unified, once again looking at it with spectacles tinted by American history, failing to see how different China (a “Family” culture) is from the US (a “Contest” culture).

Friedman sees China torn between the rich coastal regions and the poor interior. He thinks Beijing has only two options: “either weakens and loses control or clamps down so hard that it moves back to a Maoist enclosure of the country. The critical question is which outcome is more likely.”(p.97)

I beg to differ. The critical question is how to avoid both outcomes, which is not that difficult at all. Brazil and India have faced similar dilemmas for centuries, yet managed to remain whole. India had Bangladesh and Pakistan spinning off, but that actually helped it grow rather than hindered its development. Why would China not be able to pull off something similar? It is a matter of balancing control, perhaps something that Friedman is not very good at, since he tends to see things as opposite poles.

Perhaps the issue here is the Anglo-Saxon perception of “control”. Americans have a particular issue with it, having even coined the phrase “I think George is losing it”, when they mean “I think George is losing control of the situation”.

“Being in control” is something quite subjective. In some cultures, a group of people may be engaged in lively discussion and think of themselves as “having a friendly argument” or not even having an argument; they see themselves as “just talking”. Typical examples may be found in the Dutch/Scandinavian cultures and in the so-called “Solar-System” cultures such as the French, Italian and Spanish. People talk simultaneously, they interrupt each other frequently, they are loud and express emotions openly.

To an outsider coming from the Anglo-Saxon or the Germanic cultures, the situation is perceived as chaotic, and “out of control”. Interruptions are perceived as rude. Expressing emotions is seen as a sure sign of “losing it”.

To the people engaged in the situation, they are not interrupting each other at all and they are not being “emotional”. They are just being themselves…

The Chinese can be very loud and engage in lively debate, all talking at the same time. I’ve facilitated workshops with all-Chinese participants. It may seem chaotic to an outsider. Yet, when a leader within the group asks for silence, people are quick to comply. There is a lot of respect for authority (high Power Distance), very different from Anglo-Saxons (and others) who score low on Power Distance and where often people show less respect for authority.

Leaders in High Power Distance cultures can actually allow greater freedom to people, because they know that when they need to rein them in, authority will be respected. People from Low Power Distance cultures will look at these situations and perceive them as being “chaotic” at first, and leadership intervention as being “dictatorial”. The participants in the situation may see it simply as “normal.”

Beijing has room to manoeuver. It can continue to gradually relax its grip on the provinces, yet maintain national unity. Isn’t that what America is all about, in terms of giving States a certain autonomy, yet maintaining the grip of Federal Government?

The real reason why it is not necessary to fear China may actually be because China is not intending to invade anybody else, nor does it wish to annihilate anybody else. Would that be so difficult to accept?

The main goal of China is to develop its economy in order to provide a comfortable life for its citizens. It has stated that it aims to develop a strong middle class by 2020 and looks well on its way towards achieving that goal. As long as the US leaves China to be free, China will leave the US alone. Sure, they will compete. The Chinese are just as competitive as the Americans are. But they are more long-term oriented and tend to be more graceful both in defeat as in victory. Perhaps the Americans could learn a thing or two from the Chinese, starting with peaceful coexistence.

Competition does not necessarily lead to war. It may occur in sports, in developing technology, in winning clients over. Since Friedman points out that population explosion will no longer be a problem, the need for territorial expansion to accommodate a growing population will not drive military conflict. Perhaps the only driver remaining will be the greed of arms dealers.

Russia 2020 – Rematch (or rather: We Want To Beat Them Again!)

“In geopolitics, major conflicts repeat themselves. France and Germany, for example, fought multiple wars, as did Poland and Russia” (p101).

The mistaken assumptions here, once again, are: geopolitics as the sole base for analysis; and failing to see that history does not always repeat itself, most often it does not. Otherwise, there would be an American Civil War every Century, the French and the British would never be allies, and

Friedman provides an extensive analysis of Russia and its relationships with its neighbors. He even recognizes (p106) that “The Soviet Union was held together not simply by force, but by a system of economic relationships that sustained it in the same way that the Russian empire before it was sustained.”

However, he immediately forgets his own assertion and goes on to describe how Russia will invade several adjoining nations between 2010 and 2020, but the Russian military “will collapse once more shortly after 2020.” History does not necessarily repeat itself, but Friedman certainly does… He assumes that Russia will necessarily resort to military action in order to exert its influence, rather than continue to develop the economic relationships that sustained its empire 200 years ago.

I think that Russia is actually aware that it can exert influence through economic means, more effectively and efficiently than by using the military, and it has been doing just that in the past five years. It will undertake military action (like in Georgia) when it feels that a neighboring country, especially a former Soviet Union member, threatens to break away from its sphere of influence. To go from that to an invasion of Poland, an European Union member, is quite a stretch…

Friedman’s denial of the European Union’s existence is quite extraordinary. The existence of the EU gets in the way of many of his predictions about Russia, Poland, Turkey and other countries. So he chooses to pretend it is no longer there…

American Power And The Crisis Of 2030

In this chapter Friedman again turns to the past in order to explain his forecasts. In a nutshell, he predicts that from 2015 onwards immigration to the US will be encouraged rather than hindered, culminating with a huge immigration effort in the 2030’s in order to stem a labor shortage.

This is no major feat of forecasting. For the past five years advocate of immigration policy reforms have been saying that “a country without Mexicans” would be a national disaster. Friedman is simply setting the scene, in 2030, for his “War with Mexico” scenario 50 years later. He is simply stating that immigration will be significantly increased from 2015 to 2080.

The main shortcoming is that there is no analysis whatsoever about the effects of an immigration surge on the American culture itself. Friedman assumes that immigrants would simply adopt Anglo Saxon values and “the American Way Of Life”. Yet it would be quite plausible to predict something different.

Perhaps because immigrants will come in much larger numbers, they would have more of an impact on American culture rather than the other way around. Because interconnectedness would be even greater than it already is today, immigrants would stay in touch with their home values and replicate them in the US. Since they have higher birth rates, immigrants would soon become the majority of the population in the US: mixed races enjoying mixed backgrounds and mixed culture values. The Anglo-Saxons could wake up one day to find that they are actually a minority group.

This is not so far-fetched as it may seem. The situation in Brazil and in some other countries is pretty much like that already, with “whites” constituting less than half the population. Forecasting the same for the US 70 years from now does not require a lot of imagination. However, this would totally upset Friedman’s predictions. He maintains that the US will keep its culture immune to immigration influence, and that when the bigger crisis comes in 2080, there will be a war with Mexico, who will wish to regain the territory they lost in 1848. Again, this is 19^th Century thinking applied to forecasting for the 21^st Century. I think we can do better than that.

A New World Emerges (or rather: Back To The Future – 2040 looks a lot like 1940)

The big assumptions here are the collapse and fragmentation of both Russia and China, accompanied by the inexistence of the European Union. This then leads to the emergence of Poland, who gobbles up neighbors very much like a reincarnation of Nazi Germany, while at the same time Japan decides it should re-build the Asian Empire it used to dream about 100 years before, plus the emergence of Turkey trying to rebuild the Ottoman Empire.

Once more, the paradigm is that “history repeats itself”. Friedman’s prediction is that Japan needs to import raw materials so badly that it must expand its borders by conquering bits of China and Russia. I fail to see the probability of this happening, considering that:

a) the forecast (made by Friedman) is that the Japanese population will decrease, therefore putting less pressure on the need to expand;

b) the forecast (also made by Friedman) is that energy will be generated in space and that Japan will be one of the technological leaders of exploring those sources, plus mining on the moon. So why would they need to invade China?

c) Occupation of a foreign country was popular until WWII but was quickly demonstrated to be unfeasible in the second half of the 20^Th Century (and in WWII itself). The interconnectivity of the occupied people makes it too easy for them to resist occupation (think Iraq 2003-20010) and too expensive to suppress that. The Japanese should not be stupid enough to attempt that.

d) Furthermore, Friedman predicts that a united Korea will be allied with China opposing Japan. Why not Koreans and Japanese forming a commercial alliance to compete with China (rather than going to war?).

All in all, it boils down to the basic premise of countries easily undertaking military campaigns against each other, as if we were still in the 19^th Century.

The situation with Turkey is similarly improbable, but it rests on a big “if” (which Friedman does not mention, but I think needs to be mentioned as the crux of the matter). That is the admission (or not) of Turkey into the European Union. Friedman makes no reference to that, keeping consistent in ignoring the EU’s very existence.

If Turkey is admitted into the European Union sometime before 2020, then we can assume that most of his scenarios become downright unlikely. A broader and stronger EU would affect the multilateral balance of power and might even bring into consideration the participation of Russia in the EU.

On the other hand, if Turkey is shut out of the EU and is pushed by France to form an economic block with the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries, then Friedman’s “Turkish Delight” becomes a natural evolution of that situation. As a matter of fact, I would even recommend Europeans to read Friedman’s book in order to support the case for Turkey joining the EU. Otherwise, the emergence of Turkey as a hostile player in 2040 might become quite likely.

The Polish scenario, however, remains very far-fetched. It hinges on the collapse of the European Union altogether, and the decline of France and Germany as “Old Europe” goes under. It seems like George W. Bush’s pipe dream coming true after those countries refused to support the invasion of Iraq. It also seems more like wishful thinking from revengeful Republicans, rather than unbiased forecasting of a likely scenario.

This Friedmanish “New World” leads to the formation of a “coalition” against the US, led by Poland, Turkey and Japan. Any resemblance to “the Axis” formed by Germany, Italy and Japan in 1940 is NOT a coincidence… It is merely “history repeating itself”. To me, it reeks of American TV’s summer re-runs and bad Hollywood remakes of classic films. Surely humanity can come up with something better, wouldn’t you say?

The 2040s – Prelude to War (or rather: Here We Go Again)

Friedman starts off well on this chapter, asking. “The question that will come to the fore in 2040 will be this: What will be the relationship between the US and the rest of the world?” That is indeed the right question, but Friedman’s answer is shaped by his tainted predictions for the period 2010-2040. Therefore, in a world where China has been split into smaller countries, some of which form an alliance with Japan; where Russia has no relevant role any longer; and where the European Union does not exist, the natural outcome is the emergence of the anti-American “JaPolKey Coalition”.

This notion, of course, feeds well into American paranoia: “We are the greatest, so naturally other countries will envy us and will band together to destroy us. However, they will not succeed, because we are the greatest and will emerge from the conflict even greater!”

Paranoia is a serious mental illness, all the more serious because it leads to behavior which is dangerous for the people around the ill person, and eventually leads to the self-destruction of the person. Most, if not all, of the kooks who undertake mass shootings in public places in America are paranoid, bringing death and destruction to those around them until either they commit suicide or are taken down by the police.

Imagine how dangerous things can be when a whole nation goes on such a rampage, believing that everyone else is out to get them and the only way to avoid it is to “do unto others before they do unto you”. And they have nuclear weapons.

This is why I am concerned with the ideas set forth in George Friedman’s book. They feed American paranoia, which represents a threat to the whole world.

The solution, however, is not to gang up on the paranoid guy and jump him before he starts shooting. This would only trigger Friedman’s WWIII scenario. The solution is therapy, and in this case, group therapy might be the best strategy.

Paranoid behavior has its roots in a deep inferiority complex. The person feels so inferior, and this hurts so much, that a defense mechanism is produced saying that actually the person is not inferior, but rather is superior to everyone else. In fact, goes the mechanism, I am so superior that I am envied by all others and they are trying to get me.

Psychotherapy of such cases involves allowing the person to experience that he/she is no better and no worse than anybody else. It involves allowing the person to experience giving and receiving love, and to realize that there is no need to fear others nor to feel neither inferior nor superior to them.

This is not an easy process. It’s complicated and it takes time. It requires tapping on resources the person has deep inside him/herself

Taking the analogy to the level of a country like the US (not the only paranoid culture in the world, but the biggest and most capable of bringing destruction to everybody else) the solution will most likely come from within, from the changes brought by the ascension of women in America and from transformations brought about by immigration which change the American culture from the inside out.

What Next?

Hopefully the rest of the world will not need to “contain” the US, but rather will help the US by interacting continuously with its culture and by supporting its healthier aspects.

If this happens, then we will not have a “Prelude to War” in 2040 nor a “Preparing for War” and neither a “World War”, which constitute Chapters 9, 10 and 11 of Friedman’s book.

Chapter 12 (“A Golden Decade”) describes how wonderful life will be (specially in the US) after they’ve beaten everybody else. An economic boom is outlined, like the 1950’s and 1960’s. History repeating itself yet again (this time, the good parts too).

The last Chapter of the book (13) describes the “Mexican crisis”, and Friedman leaves that one open-ended. Who will win the Mexican-American war of 2080? Maybe he intends to tell that story in his next book, which might well be titled “The 22^nd Century: America turns of age”, since he often points out that the US is still an adolescent nation and will continue to be one throughout the 21^st Century.

I am all in favor of making predictions about the future. I do not believe that “it’s hard to tell what’s gonna happen next quarter, let alone 100 years from now!”. It is always useful to discuss what might happen in the future. It is especially important because such discussions help us shape what is going to happen.

The future is not “something that happens to us”. We make things happen. We all live by choice, not by chance, even though we might not always be aware of it. The more aware of it we are, the better prepared we will be to make decisions that shape the future we want from us.

Therefore, I welcome more discussions about the next year, the next decade, the next century. This will help us develop a better world for our children and grandchildren.